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Voice of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

Thursday, November 13, 2025

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SHAHZAD MASOOD ROOMI Kurram District, located in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province near the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, is a volatile region marked by recurring sectarian violence between its Shia and Sunni Muslim communities. Unlike most of Pakistan, where Sunnis form the overwhelming majority, Kurram has a significant Shia population—estimated at around 42%—with the Turi tribe being predominantly Shia and the Bangash tribe divided between both sects. This demographic mix, combined with historical tensions, land disputes, and external influences, fuels ongoing conflict. Although the violence in Kurram is often portrayed as sectarian unrest, it is not purely sectarian in origin. Many clashes stem from underlying issues such as land ownership disputes, which escalate into sectarian violence due to tribal and religious affiliations. This complex law-and-order situation has turned Kurram into a hotbed for militant groups such as Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Islamic State-Khorasan (ISKP), and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, all of which have targeted Shia communities after labeling them apostates. Meanwhile, the Sunni community has pointed to the Zainebiyoun Brigade—a Shia militia with ties to Iran—as a contributor to the violence. The district's proximity to Afghanistan adds another layer of complexity, as cross-border militancy and refugee influxes further inflame local rivalries. Violence in Kurram has intensified over the past two years. Escalation of Violence in 2023-2025 In July 2023, a land dispute between Shia and Sunni tribes in Upper Kurram led to violent confrontations, resulting in at least 13 deaths and 90 injuries over several days. Despite a ceasefire, tensions persisted, with road blockages causing shortages of food, fuel, and medicine. Similarly, on October 12, 2024, a Sunni convoy under paramilitary escort was ambushed in Kurram, killing 16 people, including women and children. This incident highlighted the ongoing cycle of retaliatory attacks between sectarian groups. Another major wave of violence struck the district from November 21-23, 2024, when gunmen attacked two Shia convoys traveling from Parachinar to Peshawar, killing 52 people, including women and children. Although no group claimed responsibility, the attack triggered retaliatory assaults by Shia groups on Sunni areas such as Bagan village, where markets and homes were torched. Over three days, the death toll exceeded 80, with more than 200 people killed in Kurram since July 2024 alone. A seven-day ceasefire was brokered on November 24, but sporadic violence continued. On January 17, 2025, unidentified gunmen ambushed and torched aid trucks in Kurram, killing two security personnel and five drivers. This attack underscored the persistent insecurity despite repeated peace efforts. State Response: Inconsistent and Ineffective State's response to the Kurram crisis has been inconsistent, relying heavily on short-term measures while placing the burden of maintaining order primarily on the Pakistan Army. Governance failures have exacerbated the situation, contributing to the country's overall deteriorating law and order. Mediation Efforts: The government has repeatedly dispatched delegations, including provincial officials and tribal jirgas (councils), to broker truces. For instance, after the November 2024 violence, a high-level team—including KPK's Chief Secretary and Inspector General of Police—negotiated a ceasefire. However, these agreements, like the 10-day truce in late November 2024, frequently collapse due to intermittent clashes. Security Deployment: Police and paramilitary units have been deployed to enforce peace and escort convoys. Following the January 2025 attack, a large-scale operation targeting militants was launched in Kurram, marking the first significant military action in the district in recent years. However, militants and sectarian fighters often vacate conflict zones during operations, only to return once military campaigns conclude. Infrastructure and Aid: Authorities have intermittently restored access to blocked roads, such police presence, and the slow establishment of a as the Thal-Parachinar highway, and delivered humanitarian aid. For instance, in January 2025, aid convoys transported food and medicine to affected areas. Policy Commitments: After the 2018 merger of tribal areas into KPK, the government pledged to integrate these regions by ensuring security and development. However, implementation has lagged significantly. Current Situation and Challenges Despite these efforts, the situation in Kurram remains dire. Ceasefires offer only temporary relief, while the root causes of violence remain unaddressed. The death toll—exceeding 200 since July 2024—indicates a worsening security situation. Road closures persist, exacerbating humanitarian crises, with reports of shortages continuing into March 2025. The January 2025 security operation suggests a shift toward a more proactive approach, but its long-term effectiveness remains uncertain. Weak governance, a limited justice system following the FATA merger continue to hinder lasting stability. Bunker Destruction: Authorities have demolished 979 bunkers in Kurram over the past two months as part of the Kohat peace agreement signed on January 1, 2025. These fortifications, previously held by both conflicting sides, were removed entirely, marking a key step towards the restoration of peace. The demolition, confirmed to be 100% complete, aligns with broader peace efforts that include disarmament and deployment of a special force for regional security. Road Protection: Road protection in the Kurram District remains a significant concern due to ongoing security challenges. Several measures by security forces and local administration have been taken to enhance security. These include the deployment of a special police force dedicated to securing the Parachinar Road and the establishment of 120 security posts along the main highway in the district. Way Forward De-weaponization: Since the area is no longer part of FATA after the merger, de-weaponization targeting illegal arms among sectarian groups and tribal militias is essential for peace. Resolve Land Disputes: Establish a robust land commission to settle disputes in areas like Boshera and Balishkhel, which frequently trigger violence. The 2021 initiative must be enforced with sustained follow-through. Strengthen Governance: Fully integrate Kurram into KPK administrative and legal framework, replacing tribal customs with a functional justice system to deter violence and ensure accountability. Disarmament campaigns are essential to address the proliferation of heavy weapons. Promote Economic Development: Invest in infrastructure, education, and healthcare to reduce marginalization—a key driver of unrest. The Accelerated Implementation Program funds must be effectively utilized. Foster Community Reconciliation: Encourage dialogue between Shia and Sunni leaders to address longstanding grievances, including the displacement of Sunnis from the 2007 clashes, and focus on trust-building rather than temporary truces. Enhance Border Security: Strengthen control along the Afghan border to curb militant infiltration and arms smuggling. Despite fencing efforts, terrorists continue to exploit natural corridors such as riverbeds and water streams. Without addressing these structural issues, Kurram's cycle of violence will persist, undermining state authority and human security. The KPK government must establish strong provincial institutions to address local challenges while proactively engaging sectarian groups to counter misunderstandings and disinformation in real-time. This is undoubtedly a difficult task, but it is essential. Military action alone cannot compensate for governance failures—this shortcoming must be addressed not only in Kurram but across the country.

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