Since the beginning of December 2022, militants have been systematically attacking Pakistan’s western border regions, causing a wave of terror that has recently hit the country.
Pakistani Taliban (TTP) have stepped up their attacks since late November violating the ceasefire agreement. On the other hand, Afghan Taliban border forces have at least twice shelled residential areas in Chaman with mortars.
Throughout peace negotiations with the TTP, attacks on Pakistani forces continued unabatedly, usually attributed to TTP-affiliated militant factions mostly the Hafiz Gul Bahadur group or HGB network. Relatively unfamiliar new groups like Majlis-e-Askari or Ittehad-ul-Mujahideen also joined the list.
Some observers are of the view that the Afghan Taliban may also be utilising the TTP for their own strategic depth manoeuvres against Pakistan. In hindsight, Pakistan’s attempt to negotiate a solution with the TTP via the Afghan Taliban appears overly optimistic.
In pursuit of peace in the region and its tribal districts particularly bordering Afghanistan, the Pakistani side purposely ignored and whitewashed hostile sentiments of the Afghan Taliban ranks & files towards her.
After calling off the ceasefire, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan launched attacks inside Pakistan amplifying the threat level.
It is crucial to comprehend the TTP’s advantages and disadvantages as well as its organizational structure and strength in the face of a recent uptick in terrorist activities.
The leadership of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan was essentially ejected from Pakistan after the Zarb-e-Azb operation. The TTP leadership and fighters were forced into Afghanistan by the operation, despite the fact that it caused significant casualties among civilians and Pakistan’s Military.
Later, TTP continued its militant activities against Pakistan while fighting alongside the Afghan Taliban against the US and other adversaries. When the Taliban tookover Afghanistan in August 2021, these individuals who had been friendly with the Afghan Taliban for a decade or more, fought alongside them, coexisted contentedly with them, and found a secure home, had a wonderful opportunity to regroup.
The Taliban in Afghanistan pledged that militants operating on Afghan soil would refrain from attacking neighbouring country when they signed the Doha Agreement in Qatar. True, the Taliban have essentially forbidden groups like Al-Qaeda, the Islamic Movement of Uzbakistan (IMU) and others from attacking countries of their origin.
TTP, on the other hand, has found a safe haven in Afghanistan, where Afghan Taliban-affiliated clerics issued a fatwa against Pakistan, permitting them to operate there. Since the Afghan Taliban took control of Kabul in August 2021, this violent trend has only intensified.
In 2014, a number of anti-Pakistan terrorist organizations, including three al-Qaeda local sections split from TTP, however, as Afghan Taliban were advancing on Kabul, these split-out militant factions merged with TTP again increasing aggression against Pakistan.
TTP militants remained active against Pakistan from Afghanistan as well as inside Pakistan, which has led to an unprecedented situation.
A number of Afghan nationals were found carrying out TTP terror attacks inside Pakistan. The Afghan Taliban victory and the current scenario in Afghanistan have altered TTP’s strategy and policies as well. They mobilised anti-Pakistan and anti-Army animosity, especially among Pashtun tribesmen, by appealing to Pashtun nationalism and anti-American feeling in Pakistan and presenting themselves as a distinct entity outside of their ideological realm. The majority of Pashtun nationalist groups use the same narrative for furthering their political career.
If taken into account, it is likely that this will be the Taliban’s biggest strength going forward; yet, at the same time, protests against terrorism, extremism, and discussions are taking place in the tribal regions and in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. It will be difficult for the TTP to attract a sizable number of recruits in Pakistan’s tribal areas given the country’s fierce anti-militancy views. However, Tehreek-e-Taliban haschanged its narrative, making it more reliant on Afghans, under the guise of opposing Pakistan’s and other regional and international countries’ decades-long anti-terrorism efforts in Afghanistan.
The Pakistani security forces and law enforcement agencies vigorous efforts to combat the terrorist threat are expected to result in the TTP’s demise within the next few years. However, despite the Pakistan Army’s efforts to do so, the political system gives the matter insufficient attention. The Pakistani political class failed to create a coherent narrative that challenges the beliefs of the terrorist organizations, despite the fact that they must do so in any scenario.
Secondly, if the Taliban can restrain the IMU and Al-Qaeda, why can’t they restrain the TTP from attacking Pakistan? This issue must be taken up with the Afghan Taliban for a meaningful solution. Pakistan had previously made considerable contributions to assisting the Afghan Taliban; as a result, it should now be recognised for its sacrifices.
Many in Pakistan are perturbed at the negotiations with the TTP, but it is also true that the TTP leadership is Pakistani, and we must decide what to do with the militant group’s fighters and families if Afghanistan decides to deport them.
Even though the TTP’s activities and attacks have been ongoing for months during peace talks with the Pakistan government, the incident in Bannu, Lakki Marwat was solely used as a pretext for the TTP to claim the truce had been broken.
The militant group started attacking the police, security personnel, and political officials in and around Peshawar even before they end the ceasefire officially.
This reality serves as a warning that Pakistan will need political, religious, and ethnic unity for kinetically combating the threat of terrorism coming from both within the country and its neighbours, rather than relying solely on diplomacy and negotiations. changed its narrative, making it more reliant on Afghans, under the guise of opposing Pakistan’s and other regional and international countries’ decades-long anti-terrorism efforts in Afghanistan.
The Pakistani security forces and law enforcement agencies vigorous efforts to combat the terrorist threat are expected to result in the TTP’s demise within the next few years. However, despite the Pakistan Army’s efforts to do so, the political system gives the matter insufficient attention. The Pakistani political class failed to create a coherent narrative that challenges the beliefs of the terrorist organizations, despite the fact that they must do so in any scenario.
Secondly, if the Taliban can restrain the IMU and Al-Qaeda, why can’t they restrain the TTP from attacking Pakistan? This issue must be taken up with the Afghan Taliban for a meaningful solution. Pakistan had previously made considerable contributions to assisting the Afghan Taliban; as a result, it should now be recognised for its sacrifices.
Many in Pakistan are perturbed at the negotiations with the TTP, but it is also true that the TTP leadership is Pakistani, and we must decide what to do with the militant group’s fighters and families if Afghanistan decides to deport them.
Even though the TTP’s activities and attacks have been ongoing for months during peace talks with the Pakistan government, the incident in Bannu, Lakki Marwat was solely used as a pretext for the TTP to claim the truce had been broken.
The militant group started attacking the police, security personnel, and political officials in and around Peshawar even before they end the ceasefire officially.
This reality serves as a warning that Pakistan will need political, religious, and ethnic unity for kinetically combating the threat of terrorism coming from both within the country and its neighbours, rather than relying solely on diplomacy and negotiations.
Irfan Ullah Jan, a resident of the tribal District of Kurram lost both of his legs during an IED blast in his home town while returning from school on 25th of July 2011. Irfan was provided with prosthetic legs at the Armed Institute of Rehabilitation and this became a turning point in his life when he decided to work for society and a better Pakistan. It took him several years to establish a Non-for-Profit organization named FATA Disable Welfare Organization. He obtained scholarships and enrolled thousands of differently able and non-privileged students in education institutions.
they navigate from adolescence to adulthood will determine not only their own future, but for their families and communities. So, if provided with skills, trainings and opportunities they could become an asset to the state and contribute a whole some to the economy, social and political development of Pakistan.
